Syria's Response to International Pressure

It has been said that how people react to a crisis helps to shape the character of that person. No other test than the recent Lebanese crisis has helped people understand just what kind of leader President Bashar Al-Assad is and what kind of government he is leading. For many, Lebanon was going to test the strength of the Damascus regime. It has in many ways. Articles circulating in the wake of the international response to Al-Hariri's assassination and calls for Syria's withdrawal reported both Chirac and Sharon preparing for the possible collapse of President Al-Assad's regime. It is still to be seen whether those events in neighbouring Lebanon will have a bigger impact in Syria.

Research has helped us comprehend the intentions of President Hafez Al-Assad during his tenure in office, but to many, Dr. Bashar Al-Assad remains an enigma. Through analysis on the responses of the Syrian government, particularly President Al-Assad, we can now formulate an opinion regarding the intentions of this government. The Lebanese situation is a good place to start with this analysis, so I shall first focus on the regime's response to UNSC Resolution 1559.

1559 was adopted on September 2, 2004 to help prevent Syria from extending pro-Syrian President Emille Lahoud's term in office for another three years, and in order to get Syria out of Lebanon. The initial reaction from Damascus was to ignore it. This was a confirmation from Syria that the policy of not giving in to international demands immediately was still on the agenda in Damascus. Syria has long wished to represent herself as the last bastion of Arab nationalism opposed to meddling by outsides in her affairs. However, Damascus did send its own message to the UN, advising it to stay out of its affairs since this issue solely involved Syrian-Lebanese relations. Two months later, after the Lebanese constitution was amended, Lahoud was re-elected as the President of Lebanon.

Fast forward to February 14, 2005. Anti-Syran Lebanese start blaming Syria for the assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri, but Damascus denies these accusations, and in turn, blames Israel for provoking further anti-Syrian sentiment. The day of Al-Hariri's funeral and a day after the USA recalled its ambassador to Damascus, Syrian Prime Minister Naji Al-Otri meets with the Iranian government and a united front against American threats is established.

When pro-Syrian Lebanese Prime Minister Omar Karameh announces the resignation of his government on February 21st, Lahoud reappoints him to form a new government. In fact, Syria doesn't formally respond to Lebanese calls for Syrian withdrawal until March 5th, almost three weeks later after Al-Hariri's assassination. In his speech to the People's Assembly, President Bashar Al-Assad announces a partial withdrawal of Syrian troops to the Bekaa Valley, defying President Bush's demands against 'half-hearted measures'.

The fact that Syria didn't carry out all the wishes of the international community for a long time suggests that it refuses to be told what to do. By sending this message, Syria wants to distinguish herself from her fellow Arab neighbours, who she may label as sell-outs. For example, despite Syria's isolation following the events in Beirut, many still respect the Damascus government for refusing to allow western powers to dictate to it what needs to be done and when. British MP George Galloway described the Damascus government as 'dignified' and urged it to remain steadfast.

It is true that Syria felt the pressure of the international community and left Lebanon, but she did so in her own way, without much regard for what western powers thought of her.

When Pope John Paul II died, Syria hadn't yet withdrawn all of her forces from Lebanon. People were doubtful whether President Bashar Al-Assad, seen as a controversial leader, would actually attend the funeral of the Pontiff. However, he defied the odds and headed for the Vatican. That, alone, sent a message to the world leaders around him that he had no plans to hide in a shell like Saddam Hussein, the man many in Washington like to compare him to. In truth, however, President Al-Assad is nothing like Saddam Hussein.

As Washington seized the moment over Lebanon to strike at Syria, other accusations soon followed. The Bush Administration began accusing Syria of not doing enough to prevent insurgents from crossing to Iraq on the Syrian-Iraqi border. The Damascus government kept telling anyone who listened that it was very difficult to protect the whole border, and even provided evidence that in the past, Saddam Hussein had used the unprotected border to send trucks carrying bombs to Syria because of his opposition to the Damascus Baathists. The fact that Syria couldn't protect herself then meant that she couldn't protect America either. The Americans even refused to work with the Syrians to patrol the border. In an effort to get the USA to stop throwing baseless accusations at Damascus, the Al-Assad government announced that it was ceasing cooperation with the Americans. To many, this was a risk, but to Syria, it was a way to reassert its refusal to be talked down to.

Now President Bashar Al-Assad is preparing to go to New York for the UN World Summit. This sends yet another message to Washington that Syria refuses to be set aside. President Al-Assad is also sending another message to the international community: that despite the negative campaign against Syria throughout the year, he still wants to clean up that image and move Syria forward.

When drawing conclusions about Syria's response to international pressure, I can see that she refuses to be told what to do and she refuses to be left aside. The risks Damascus is taking in order to keep up with its aims are testament to why George Galloway described the Syrian government as 'dignified'.

Syria's Role in the Middle East

Flynt Leverett's Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial By Fire presents a good understanding of how President Bashar Al-Assad has managed to stick to the script laid out by his father. A big factor that Bashar needs to adhere to is how to manage Syria's 'national security strategy and foreign policy'. Leverett lays out four major components that are necessary for Syria to avoid marginalisation:

1. Maintaining Syria's influence in Lebanon;
2. Syria's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict;
3. Maintaing Syria's role in the regional balance;
4. And maintaing a relationship with the United States.
   

This essay aims to analyse Syria's current position in relation to these four major components. It is important to realise firstly that Syria's relationship with Lebanon has created a dark cloud that that plagues Syria's overall objectives. When Bashar Al-Assad came to power in July 2000, Syria's role in world affairs was much stronger than it was after February 14, 2005.

Lebanon was an important asset to Syria. When President Hafez Al-Assad sent Syrian troops there in 1976, it was to stop Israel from establishing hegemony over Lebanon. He figured that if he could control Lebanese affairs, it would give him better bargaining power when dealing with the Israelis. Also, Lebanon could no longer be used a base for Syrian opposition. That is why it was essential to hold on to Lebanon from Syria's point of view.

Now that Syrian troops have left Lebanon and a new anti-Syrian Parliament has taken office, what options does President Bashar Al-Assad have in trying to play a role in Lebanese affairs? Well, for starters, he can close the Syrian-Lebanese border to Lebanese trade; that has already happened. Al-Assad asked Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to make sure Lebanon doesn't become an anti-Syrian base and he as agreed to that. Also, Syria can still maintain some influence over Hizbullah. All in all, despite Syria'a withdrawal from Lebanon, it still has the potential to play a role, although smaller, in Beirut's affairs.

With regards to the Arab-Israeli arena, Syria has been weakened after its retreat from Lebanon. Nevertheless, Syria's use of anti-Israeli groups is still a way to get Washington and Tel Aviv's attention. It is still a reminder that Syria has the ability to confront its enemies without having to resort to official military action. With regards to Hizbullah, any influence Syria now wields over it can be better used than when Syria occupied Lebanon. Back then, when Hizbullah carried out an attack, Syria was blamed. Today, it is harder to blame Syria because there is no more official evidence that Syria assists Hizbullah. Al-Assad's use of these groups is simply to get Israel to the negotiating table on terms favourable to Syria. However, with Ariel Sharon in power, it is quite a risk.

Diplomatic marginalisation for Syria is a nightmare. Syria knows that in order play a big role in the regional balance in the Middle East, it had to find a way to get Washington to hear its message. It continues to have two ways of doing so: through Washington's allies and states hostile to it.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, close allies of the USA, help Syria by carrying its message to the Bush Administration. Under international pressure to withdraw his troops from Lebanon, President Al-Assad sought the help of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. When the Prince told Al-Assad that Syrian-Saudi relations could be harmed if Syria refused to withdraw, Al-Assad pushed forward with the withdrawal. During the funeral of King Fahd in August 2005, President Al-Assad could be seen standing a couple meters away from the side of the new King Abdullah, a sign that Syrian-Saudi relations remain close. However, due to Rafik Al-Hariri's closeness to the Saudi royals, relations could be jeopardised between the two countries if the Mehlis report points the finger of blame on Syria.

Following the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Syria suspended diplomatic relations with Egypt for ten years from 1979 to 1989. It was a wise decision to resume them in 1989 because during that time, Syria's Gulf allies were angered by Al-Assad's support for Iran during its eight-year war with Iraq. Without the Saudis to get their message across, Syria decided to heal her wounds with Egypt. Following Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, President Al-Assad held discussions with Egyptian President Housni Mubarak in an effort to ease internation pressure on Syria. However, Mubarak is an old man. It is rather to doubtful to even think that his son may succeed him. Whoever does succeed him may not favour such close ties to Syria, especially if that new government despises what it believes to be undemocratic states.

Since supporting Iran against Iraq, both Syria and Iran have had close relations. Leverett argues that one of its aims in allying herself with such problematic states was to convey the message to Washington that there were risks involved if Syria was ignored. Damascus and Tehran's support for Hizbullah is testament to that. It should also be noted that in the aftermath of Al-Hariri's assassination, Syria was under tremendous international pressure. For its part, Washington recalled its ambassador to Damascus for consultations the day after. Damascus' response was to send Prime Minister Naji Al-Otri to meet Iranian ministers the day of Al-Hariri's funeral. The end result was a pledge by both states to form a united front to deal with Washington's threats.

Six years prior to the invasion of Iraq, Syria began opening bilateral ties with its former enemies in Baghdad. By 1997, Saddam Hussein, feeling the burden of isolation, decided it was in his best interests to engage Damascus. When Bashar took over, better relations began to develop between the former rivals. In fact, President Al-Assad sent the then-Prime Minister Mustafa Miro to Baghdad to meet President Saddam Hussein. An oil pipeline was opened between Kirkuk and the port of Banyas. This relationship with Baghdad was an even bigger message to Washington and Tel Aviv than its relation with Iran was. However, with Saddam's downfall and a pro-American government in charge, Iraq now has the potential to join Egypt and Saudi Arabia as Syria's messengers to Washington. However, this has been hampered as Iraq accuses Syria of not doing enough to protect its borders against insurgents entering Iraq.

It should also be noted that Turkey remains one of Syria's few allies in the region currently. It is important to bear in mind that the Turkish President ignored American pressure to abandon his official visit to Damascus earlier this year. US-Turkish relations have been at a low ever since Turkey refused to support the USA's Iraq war, and this has turned out to be good news for the Al-Assad regime. Despite the fact that Syria and Turkey were on the brink of war in the late 1990s, it has been the issue of Kurdish separatism that keeps them in a alliance. Since US-Turkish relations began to pick up earlier this year, Syria may now be able to look at Turkey as another of her messengers to Washington.

Currently, Syria's relationship with the USA is at a low. They could even be worse now than they were back in the 1980s when Syria and militias allied to it attacked American positions in Lebanon. Also, Washington withdrew its ambassador to Damascus back in 1987 as well when Syria was implicated in the Hindawi affair. Syria's relationship with the USA recovered from those events, but it was different back then. It those days, there was no 9-11 that could be used as a means to justify regime change in Damascus due to Washington's designation of Syria as being a state-sponsor of terrorism. Also back then, Washington didn't engage Al-Assad's Syrian opposition parties. However, this could all be ploy to get Syria to change her behaviour. There were rumors that when Secretary Rice visited Emille Lahoud in Beirut, a secret agreement was reached with Damascus. She couldn't make a visit to Damascus for political reasons, but it has been rumored that there was more to her meeting with the pro-Syrian President. As of now, there is a possibility that US-Syrian relations can recover, but only time will tell.

Leverett gives a clear understanding of how Syrian politics works in his book. It becomes easier to understand Syria's actions with regards to her neighbours. Despite the fact that Syria remains a mystery to many, Dennis Ross states that "Leverett's book begins to unravel the mystery". After reading it, one could even start to predict Syria's next moves. It has become clear that what Syria aims to do is not to give in easily to pressure. The Al-Assad regime wants to use every possible moment to avoid changing its behaviour in order to portray the message that Syria doesn't succumb to outsides pressure easily, and that engaging her on a dimplomatic level is the only way to deal with her. That is just one of the conclusions I drew from this book.

Hafez Al-Assad: The Symbol of Arab Resistance

Air Force Commander- 1963-1966
Minister of Defense- 1966-1970
Prime Minister- 1970-1971
President- 1971-2000


HARDSHIPS OF AN ALLAWI
Since the day he was born, Hafez Ali Sulaiman Al-Assad was in the unprivileged groups of Syria's minorities. Most of the power rested in the hands of the French and then with the Sunni Urban elite. Sunni religious scholars referred to Alawis as heretics and they persecuted for centuries. This was the situation most Alawis, offshoots of the Shia Islam, found themselves in at the time of Hafez Al-Assad's birth, officially declared to be October 6, 1930; some historical analysts believe he was born earlier. He was brought up in the Allawi mountains overlooking the city of Lattakia, which was located on Syria's Mediterranean coastline.

Back then, education was rare and preicous for an Allawi from a poor background whose family worked the fields. In fact, Al-Assad only managed to get accepted in a Lattakia school because he had the skills so rarely found. He was an intelligent boy who lacked the needs to carry on into higher education. It was with all these factors in mind that Al-Assad sought refuge in the ideological realms of the Arab Socialist Baath Party.


THE FIRST STEP: BAATHISM
The pan-Arab secular character mixed with socialist principles and freedom appealed to Al-Assad. For starters, since he was a member of the Allawi community, he knew the consequences of a theocratic state. Thus, it was his wish that Syria be governed under secularist principles.

Freedom and pan-Arabism worked well in Al-Assad's mind. At the time of his youth, Syria was under the French mandate, which had carved up the lands of Greater Syria with Britain into the present-day nations of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Occupied Palestine, and Israel. Al-Assad was in favour of uniting these former lands together and furthermore, uniting them with all the Arab nations to form a string union that could counter any threats in the region, such as colonial or Zionist powers. Simultaneously, it would preserve the liberty of the Arab nations.

For any person from an oppressed background, communism or socialism is an answer to dealing with hardships. Communism was a bit too extreme for the Arabs, so socialism was adopted as part of the Baathist platform. All these ideas motivated Al-Assad and he became one of the most powerful leaders in student government. Much of his motivation was accredited to Akram Al-Hawrani, the leader of the Arab Socialist Party, who merged his political faction with Michel Aflaq and Salah Al-Din Bitar's Baath Party.

THE SECOND STEP: THE MILITARY

Syria achieved her independence from French rule on April 17, 1946, when Al-Assad was still in his youth. Not long after, he completed his studies at high school. Unable to fund his univeristy tuition, unlike the urban Sunni elite, Al-Assad and many others from the same poor background opted for the military. This decision would give an advantage when the time came for the Baath's ascendence to power in Syria.

He joined the Air Force and performed well during his aerobatics exam. He was a good flyer, but once narrowly escaped death when he had to make an emergency landing. The skills he had, whether in flying or leading, would serve to distinguish is capabilities from others.

UNION WITH EGYPT

With link between the military and the Baath Party growing, pan-Arab sentiment grew in Syria in the late 1950s. With much support for the idea in both Egypt and Syria, there appeared to be no alternative but unity between the two countries in 1958. By now, the Baath's goals had already begun. President Shukri Al-Quwatli joined Egypt's Gamal Abdel-Nasser in forming the United Arab Republic (UAR).

Fearful of the fact that the Baathists would capitalize on this gain, Abdel-Nasser wanted to see its demise. the party's leaders, Michel Aflaq and Salah Al-Din Bitar complied with Abdel-Nasser's wishes. These two men were deemed traitors Hafez Al-Assad and other members. It was this act that propelled Al-Assad to take matters into his own hands. He joined fellow Alawites Salah Jadid and Muhammad Amran, and two others from the Ismaili sect in forming the Military Committee of the Baath Party. However, their hopes of continued unity were dashed when newly-installed Syrian President Nazim Qudsi, an anti-unionist who took over his new post following a coup, announced Syria's secession from the UAR in 1961.

VICTORY IN SYRIA

The Baath Party's military branch reconciled with the civilian branch, under Michel Aflaq and Salah Al-Din Bitar, but the wound caused by Aflaq would not be forgotten by men like Hafez Al-Assad. Hoping to regain power in Syria, they formed an alliance with fellow Nasserists, who were pan-Arabists. The Baathists also one loyal supporters among members of the Syrian military and intelligence services.

Inspired by the success of the Baath Party in Iraq, the Syrian Baathists moved in on the Syrian government. They successfully captured the state on March 8, 1963. It was now up to Air Force Commander Hafez Al-Assad to win the allegiance of the soldiers; he did this by introducing Baathist ideology into the military.

However, not everything went smoothly. The alliance between the Baathists and the Nasserists was showing cracks in the wall. The Nasserists were not happy and the Baathists could not risk anything at that point. A rift came between them and the Baathists ousted the Nasserists from the coalition of forces ruling Syria. This was the first rift within the Party while it was in power.

THE COUP OF 1966

Interests were clashing within the Baath Party by 1966. President Amin Al-Hafez was heading into the civilian camp, rather than keeping a balance between the military personnel and the civilians. Muhammad Amran was showing his backing for Aflaq and Bitar. Al-Assad and Salah Jadid were anxious at this point, since they knew that either the civilians or the military were going to control Syria's future. They decided to use their forces in taking out the civilians.

This conflict would bring Rifaat Al-Assad, Hafez Al-Assad's youngest brother into the spotlight. Al-Assad and Jadid were preparing to take out President Amin Al-Hafez and Selim Hatoum, a fellow Baathist, was instructed to do so. Rifaat Al-Assad joined him in the attack on the President's home. The plan was a success and Rifaat was brought into the spotlight.

The Military Committe triumphed over the civilians. Aflaq and the civilians, including former President Amin Al-Hafez fled to Iraq. Al-Assad became Minister of Defense, Jadid became Syria's main strongman, and they both chose Nour Al-Din Atassi to front for them as President of Syria.

THE SIX-DAY WAR OF 1967

When Israel attacked the combined Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in June 1967, part of what they captured were the Golan Heights from Syria. The war had come about partly due to a Soviet miscalculation that Israel was building up its forces near the Syrian border, which in turn brought Egypt and Jordan into the equation.

The capture of the Golan Heights was blamed by many on Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad. This, in turn, created a rift between Jadid and him. It was apparent that Al-Assad was becoming a scapegoat. What happened now was simply the beginning of something big that would culminate in 1970- the ouster of Jadid.

JORDAN & JADID

Throughout the 1960s, the Baathists were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. They allowed resistance groups to operate from Syria against the Israelis. Al-Assad saw this as his chance to build Syria into an Arab force that could one day be at the head of the Arab nation. Before that, he figured, he would need to establish Syria's power in the Arab Levant, the former states of Greater Syria. He saw that it would be best to bring the Palestinians under his wing, but Yasser Arafat did not want to have to take orders from anyone, even the leaders of the countries he was operating from. Therefore, in 1966, Al-Assad jailed Arafat.

Following his release, Arafat begun to set up camp in Jordan, where there was a flood of Palestinian refugee camps. King Hussein of Jordan had the same problem; he did not want the Palestinians to feel free to use his country as base for operations against Israel. The Palestinians saw this as an obstacle and decided to take out Hussein. War broke out between the Jordanians and the PLO under Arafat.

Al-Assad did not want to see the Palestinians crumble. He figured he should try to find a way to reconcile the two opposing forces, but time was not on his side. The Palestinians were losing and Al-Assad committed himself to providing help and protection to them. This meant that he would have to send Syrian tanks into Jordan. Thus, a conflict broke out between Syria and Jordan. This, in turn, brought the Jordanians and Israelis into an alliance against Syria. The chances of American intervention also had to be considered.

Al-Assad and Jadid were now facing disagreements. Both were not able to reach an understanding regarding the use of the air force in Jordan. Although Syria eventually withdrew from Jordan, and unintentionally pushed Hussein into a new relationship with Israelis, the Baathist rift grew in Syria.

Finally, on November 16, 1970, Al-Assad and his loyalists, such as Deputy Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass and Head of Air Force Intelligence Muhammad Al-Khouli, led the successful Correctionist Movement. Jadid and his loyalists, such as President Nour Al-Din Al-Atassi, were jailed, and Hafez Al-Assad became Syria's strong man.

AL-ASSAD AT THE TOP

When Hafez Al-Assad led his coup, he installed Ahmad Khatib as President and took over the port of Prime Minister. It was not until the following year that he was elected Secretary-General of the Baath Party, and a elected President of the Republic through a plebisicite. By March 13, 1973, a new constitution was promulgated that set up various institutions of power.

The Baath Party became the leading party in the state and society. Other left-wing parties were allowed to operate under the command of the Baath Party in the Progressive National Front (PNF). The Syrian Parliament, the People's Assembly, was created and it is a 250-member unicameral legislature, where 65% of the seats are allocated to the PNF. Due the popular demand by conservative Sunnis in northern Syria, who were not happy seeing an Alawite in charge in Damascus, the constitution specified that presidency was reserved for a Muslim. Al-Assad asked his friend Musa Al-Sadr, a major Shiite figure, to declare Alawites Muslims, which he did.

Assad's main aim was restoring Syria's dignity through regaining the Golan Heighst from Israel.

THE OCTOBER WAR OF 1973

Abdel-Nasser's successor in Egypt, Anwar Al-Sadat, was also suspicious of Syria's Baathists and did not hold them in high regard. He was also trying to push for peace with Israelis in the hope of regaining the Sinai Peninsula, which Egypt lost to Israel in 1967. His main aim in joining Syria in a war against Israel was to push for a better bargaining position in the peace negotiations. Unlike Syria's aims which were to take back its land, Egypt's were simply for peace purposes and praisings from Washington. In fact, Egypt had no plans of taking back the full Sinai.

The war plans were simple. Both agreed to attack Israel simultaneously on both fronts, thereby crippling Israel's chances of fighting a war on two fronts. Syria was meant to send its troops into the whole Golan, while Egypt was meant to do the same with regards to the Sinai. However, Egypt did not have long air defence missiles, so they only planned to take back a small piece of the Sinai, but they lied to Syrians about it.

So when war broke out on Al-Assad 43rd birthday (06/10/73), Syria was in a positive mood and was doing very well with regards to regaining the Golan. However, Sadat sent a message to Secretary Henry Kissinger and told him that after a small advance into the Sinai, Egypt was prepared to stop. Kissinger forwarded this to the Israeli government under Golda Meir. The Israelis, seeing that their western front was now secure, advanced against the Syrians. This spelled disaster for Al-Assad who was angered by Al-Sadat. Syria's chances of regaining the Golan were now lost.

Hoping to sideline Syria's power in the region by getting its main ally Egypt to sign a peace deal with Israel, Kissinger, a pro-Israeli Jew, sought to give the Syrians some carrots to keep the Egyptians happy. After all, Al-Sadat could not forward with his negotiations and look like a massive traitor to the Syrians. Al-Assad was unaware of Kissinger's plans, so he accepted Israel's disengagement from Quneitra Province in the Golan, but he refused to attend a Geneva Conference for peace negotiations, unlike Al-Sadat who jumped at the idea.

LEBANON'S MELTING POT

By 1975, Lebanon was in a civil war between left-wing Palestinian sympathizers and right-wing Christian nationalists. Al-Assad was worried that should the left-wing Muslims win the war, since they had the capabilities to, a radical pro-Palestinian state would be right on Syria's western border. This radical state could attack Israel and thus, justify an Israeli invasion, which would be a blow to Al-Assad's pan-Arab plan. In other words, Al-Assad needed to make sure the Israelis had no excuse to invade, because he could not risk losing Lebanon to the Zionists. Therefore, Kissinger worked out another plan.

Kissinger figured that if Al-Assad joined the Christians, the Muslims would be defeated and no longer pose a threat to the Israelis. Al-Assad, unaware of this plan, saw it as a way to defeat the radicals, while being able to bring the Christians under his wing and thus, extend his power to Lebanon. Therefore, despite the condemnations and the possibility of deteriorating relationships with his Arab neighbours, Al-Assad joined the Christians after Lebanon's Christian President Suleiman Franjieh asked for Syria's assitance in 1976. This was against the PLO made relations between Al-Assad and Arafat even worse.

THE FUNDAMENTALIST THREAT

The Muslim Brotherhood had opposed Al-Assad's rule since day one. Most of them concentrated their forces in the northern city of Hama. In fact, they first revolved against the Baathists in 1964, but were defeated. They stayed quiet for a bit, but then restarted their campaign against the Baathists in 1976. One of the reasons was because Al-Assad sided with the Christians against the pro-Palestinian forces.

The Muslim Brotherhood began targeting Baathists and Alawites. In 1980, they attempted to assassinate Al-Assad. By 1982, Al-Assad's patience ran out. Syrian soliders were attacked in Hama and Al-Assad now sought to take them out. For three weeks, Syrian forces laid siege to the city of Hama. The number of casualties was high. It was a six-year civil war between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Baathist government in which many on both sides were killed.

The Syrian faction of the Muslim Brotherhood divided after Hama. Many were imprisoned and others went off into exile. In 1980, a law was passed which stated that anyone found to be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood would face the death penalty. For the time being, the Muslim Brotherhood's activities in Syria were no longer a threat to the government.

AL-SADAT'S FINAL BETRAYAL

Against the wishes of many Arab leaders, including President Hafez Al-Assad, Anwar Al-Sadat went ahead and made peace with Israelis on March 26, 1979. Syria severed all diplomatic relations with Egypt and to make matters worse for Al-Sadat, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League.

Al-Assad knew that he had lost an ally in the war against the Israelis by 1978. He then turned to neighbouring Baathist Iraq, where he hoped to sign a pact. In fact, unity was on the table and Al-Assad was ready to join forces with Iraq's Ahmad Hassan Bakar. However, Bakar's demise was confirmed in 1978 when Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussein forced Bakar's retirement and took over. Saddam Hussein believed that unity with Syria would delay his ascent to power and thus, he would have none of it.

Syria now had no real effective ally it could count on. On October 6, 1981, while commemorating the eighth year of the October War, opponents of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty assassinated Anwar Al-Sadat. Vice-President Housni Mubarak succeeded him.

THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN WAR IN LEBANON

Al-Assad had first joined the Christians in their fight against the pro-Palestinians. However, when he found out what were the Israeli-Christian plans, he turned against his allies. He turned his attention to the Druzes and other left-wing groups opposed to Christian domination of Lebanon. Now Syrian forces were fighting against the Christians, under Bashir Gemayel, who were allied with Israel.

When the Israeli ambassador was almost assassinated in June 1982 by a member of Abu Nidal's Anti-Arafat Palestinian group, Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon did not seem to care that it was not Arafat who carried out the attempt. They used it as an excuse to invade Lebanon in 1982, and ally themselves with the Christians against the Palestinians, many of whom were allied with Syria. Constant bombardment of Beirut infuriated the citizens living there. Sharon;s tactic was to smoke out the Palestinians and it worked. Fed up with the destruction of their capital, the Lebanese called on the Palestinians to leave, which they did. Israel was now moving in on securing Lebanon as a satellite state.

Al-Assad now was afraid that Syria was getting sidelined in the region. Another victory for the Israelis was the election of Bashir Gemayel as the new Lebanese President. However, that victory was short-lived when Gemayel was assassinated in September 1982. A member of the Syrian National Party was accused of the murder. In his stead, his older brother, the more moderate Amin Gemayel became President of Lebanon.

Nevertheless, Israel was prepared to get a peace deal signed with Amin Gemayel's government. The Americans sponsored the peace initiative. Syria, anxious about this peace treaty, began aiding militias opposed to it, such as Druzes, to fight the Christians. Israelis and Americans were caught in the middle. The Americans, angered by Syria's methods, began shelling its forces in the Bekaa Valley. The Syrians shot down two American warplanes.

When the American barracks in Beirut were attacked, the finger of blame lay on Hizbullah, and it was believed that Iran and Syria were behind it. However, the Israelis and the Americans, seeing that their casualties were growing, had no other choice, but to begin withdrawing from Lebanon.

Syria was now becoming the dominant force in Lebanon. Amin Gemayel had no other option but to submit to the Syrians. The peace deal with Israel was cancelled before it could take effect. This was now the beginning of Syria's tutelage over Lebanon.

JOINING FORCES WITH IRAN

Al-Assad did not trust Saddam Hussein from the moment the latter ascended to power. They were both Baathist rivals, each accusing the other of misrepresenting the Arab cause. Attacks on each other became the norm. It was for these reasons that Syria hoped to contain Iraq by joing Iran in its war against Saddam Hussein. For eight years, Syria sided with Iran against Arab wishes. If Saddam Hussein was able to defeat Iran, it would give more legitimacy to his Baath Party. That is why it became a precedent for both Syria and Iraq to aid each other's enemies.

VICTORY IN LEBANON

Seeing that Al-Assad was gaining ground in Lebanon, there were some Lebanese Christians who opposed him. Among them were Samir Geagea of the Lebanese Forces and provisional Prime Minister Michel Aoun. Both attempted to fight the Al-Taif Accords, which pretty much designated Syria as Lebanon's parent country. However, they both caught up in a fight against themselves, with Aoun trying to curb the power of the militias. Syria was able to exploit the situation to its advantage.

It was Saddam Hussein, ironically, that helped Al-Assad secure Lebanon. When he invaded Kuwait, George Bush Sr. needed Syrian support to oust him from the oil-rich emirate. The price of Kuwait ended up being Lebanon. Aoun had been receiving supplies from Iraq and had been criticizing the Americans as well. Thus, there was little use to help him. Instead, Bush gave Al-Assad the green light to take him out. Geagea had also been cornered and sent to prison in 1994 on charges of murdering Dany Chamoun, Prime Minister Rashid Karameh, and other crimes it was believed. Lebanon now came under the Syria's wings, but the southern part was occupied by the Israelis who remained resisted by Hizbullah.

THE PRICE OF LEBANON

For President Al-Assad, the price of Lebanon was helping the Americans liberate Kuwait. Saddam Hussein was a pest for Al-Assad, sidelining him would be a great accomplishment for the Syrian leader. Thus, he joined the US-led coalition against Iraq. The end result was a great achievement for Syria.

The Syrians had long been allied with the Soviets. However, their relationship was not always the best since Al-Assad resisted Soviet's wish to have some say over Syrian policy. When he joined the Christians, the Soviets were unhappy. However the Syrian-Soviet relationship was a friendly one in which the Soviets gave Al-Assad a plethora of military supplies. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was a wise choice for Al-Assad to side with the Americans against Iraq. Billions of dollars flowed into the economy, especially from thankful Gulf states like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

THE PEACE TALKS

Another reward for helping the Americans was the Madrid Peace Conference. Al-Assad hoped that Syria could join forces with the other Arab states in conflict with Israel and present a united front. However, Jordan and the PLO went a separate way, with Palestinians negotiating the Oslo Accords. Syria was unimpressed, especially when the Israelis declared that they were not ready to withdraw completely from the Golan Heights.

Israeli-Syrian peace talks failed on a number of occasions besides the Madrid Conference. They fell apart with Yitzhkak Rabin, and it was too late to restart them when Rabin was assassinated in 1995. They also fell apart with Ehud Barak in March 2000.

Syria resented Jordan for signing a peace deal with the Israelis in 1994 and destroying any united front. Al-Assad had been trying different means to get King Hussein to stop negotiating separately, but Hussein decided it was a right time when Arafat signed the Oslo Accords with Rabin on September 13, 1993. Syria and Lebanon were now the last bastion of Arab resistance.

A MAJOR SETBACK

President Hafez Al-Assad suffered a major setback in 1994 with regards to the succession. It had widely been believed in the 1980s that Rifaat Al-Assad would emerge as President Assad's successor, but Rifaat's behaviour during Hafez's recovery after his heart attack hurt the President. Rifaat saw a chance to bid for power, but President Al-Assad realized that Rifaat's wings may have to be clipped. From 1983-4, both were in conflict, and finally, when Rifaat was preparing a coup, as many believed, President Al-Assad sought the chance to sideline Rifaat. He was appointed as an honourary Vice-President and lives in exile.

After the Rifaat episode, Hafez Al-Assad looked to his eldest son Bassel as a possible successor. Bassel Al-Assad was a characted of athletic ability and was also seen as a military man. He was an equestrian and a champion in this sport. It was believed that he may wed the daughter of King Hussein at one point, which could have improved Syrian-Jordanian relations in the long-term. He was becoming a major figure in Syrian politics by the 1990s and his picture appeared on the presidential ballot during Hafez Al-Assad's plebiscite in 1992. The picture symbolized Bassel's succession. With preparations going well, tragedy struck the Al-Assad family on January 21, 1994. While on his way to Damascus International Airport, Bassel Al-Assad was killed in an automobile accident.

Bassel's death was a major tragedy for President Al-Assad and a major setback for those who favoured the continuation of the Al-Assad regime. Therefore, President Al-Assad's second eldest son, Bashar Al-Assad, was called back from his studies in the United Kingdom to fill Bassel's shoes. Bashar had been studying to be an ophthalmologist, not a politican. His pursuit of medicine echoed his father's wish to study the same subject. Nevertheless, like father, like son, Bashar had to give it up for the presidency of Syria. He would now start a six-year grooming period.

THE TURKISH ISSUE

One fact both the Turks and Syrians fear is Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Syria sought to contain it by supporting Kurdish groups, and by even allowing Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdish leader, to seek refuge in Syria. This was a problem for the Turks who regarded Ocalan as a terrorist. They sought his extradition, but Syria refused. This made the Turks very angry.

It was this anger that probably led them to blocking water on Euphrates river from reaching Syria. This created an even tenser atmosphere between the two. The Israeli-Turkish alliance signed earlier only made relations worse. Bomb attacks in Syria by the Turks was used to show Syria just how committed it was to getting Syria to stop supporting the Kurds. Both countries were now on the brink of war.

It was the election of a new government in Turkey that helped avoid a military conflict. Al-Assad and the Turks struck a deal in the late 1990s. Ocalan was told to leave Syria and Al-Assad no longer supported the Kurdish groups. Although realtions between the Syrians and the Kurds deteroriated, it saved Syria from another war.

In fact, it is the Kurdish issue that has now brought both Syria and Turkey so much closer together. Today, Turkey may be regarded as Syria's closest ally in the region.

HIS LEGACY

President Hafez Al-Assad's death was announced on June 10, 2000. Dr. Bashar Al-Assad succeeded his father as President on July 17, 2000 and has set Syria on a path towards reform. However, reform does not necessarily mean that there was something wrong with the system. In fact, it means that Syria is accommodating the winds of change. Hafez Al-Assad was known for this. Whenever a major event like the fall of the Soviet Union happened, he knew how to respond to it. He had based his system on the Easten European ones, so when they fell, he merely changed a few things around. Law No. 10 of 1991 is testament to that since it encouraged foreign investment.

Al-Assad's main goal was Syria at the head of an Arab union. He tried getting this done with regards to the Levant, and Lebanon turned out to be a success story until 2005. Syria, today, is the last bastion of Arab resistance against Israel. Al-Assad made that happen because he did not sell out like Al-Sadat, Arafat, and Hussein did. He will go down in history as true Arab leader who resisted destroying Syrian dignity, like many in the region did. Many regard him as the most respectable Arab leader. Now it is one President Bashar Al-Assad's shoulders to keep that image alive.